Policy Recommendations

1. Adopt a realistic view on the various dilemmas of a southern and eastern EU enlargement and address them openly to relieve tensions.
2. Monitor and combat sovereignism within the EU, signalling to candidate countries the necessity to overcome similar tendencies before their potential accession.
3. Develop an innovative approach to dealing with the EU’s periphery that utilises disruptive developments and enables a reassessment of buffer zones as intermediate peacekeeping regions.

Abstract

Tensions between enlargement and further integration have accompanied the European Union’s (EU) development for a long time. Under the specific geopolitical conditions surrounding the enlargement to include the Western Balkans and Black Sea countries, several dilemmas arise that are difficult to resolve. This Policy Brief discusses geopolitical rivalry, time pressure, democratic deficits, and sovereignty concerns in the accession countries and sovereignism within the EU, multiple distribution conflicts, and the elimination of buffer zones, including war.

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Mission Almost Impossible. Dilemmas of a Southern and Eastern Enlargement of the European Union

I. High stakes

It is by no means certain that we will have one, big round of enlargement in the near future. However, strong geopolitical pressure has led to the upcoming enlargement to the south and east being considered and discussed as a package. In any case, the current discourse among think tanks predominantly focuses on one enlargement and its particular challenges. This would include the Western Balkan countries Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia and the Black Sea countries Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia. It is unlikely that all of these countries will become European Union (EU) members at the same time. But the accession process of a smaller group also confronts the EU with very particular questions.

The special framework conditions surrounding an enlargement to the south and east create further tensions between enlargement and integration and lead to numerous dilemmas for the EU. This Policy Brief argues that an enlargement of the EU to the south and east is geopolitically necessary but extremely challenging in terms of integration. This represents the core dilemma the EU faces in 2025. Six key issues have intensified “the old ‘widening versus deepening’ dilemma” (Croft et al. 1999: 78; Vobruba 2003) compared to 2004/2007: 1. geopolitical rivalry, 2. time pressure, 3. democratic deficits in the accession countries, 4. sovereignty concerns in the accession countries and sovereignism within the EU, 5. multiple distribution conflicts, and 6. the elimination of buffer zones, including war.

This Policy Brief argues that an enlargement of the EU to the south and east is geopolitically necessary but extremely challenging in terms of integration.

II. The geopolitical rivalry

The rivalry between the global West and China/Russia has fundamentally changed the quality of the conditions under which the EU can expand. While geopolitical rivalries have always played a role in the EU enlargements, they are now more intense and explicit: “This firm, merit-based prospect of full EU membership for the Western Balkans is in the Union’s very own political, security and economic interest. In times of increasing global challenges and divisions, it remains more than ever a geostrategic investment in a stable, strong and united Europe. A credible accession perspective is the key incentive and driver of transformation in the region and thus enhances our collective security and prosperity.” (European Commission 2020: 1) However, the EU’s expansion policy continues to be guided by a “Eurocentric attitude” (Lehne 2014: 7), which holds that it has immense appeal to its neighbours as a “magnet for prosperity” and as an “exporter of values”, meaning that the interest in accession predominantly lies with the candidate countries. The basic pattern that emerges from this view is as follows: the EU formulates accession conditions and assesses readiness for accession. The EU slows down; the candidates push forward. This pattern never quite corresponded to reality, as can be demonstrated by reconstructing the dynamics of European enlargements as a series of political trade-offs: it has always been about a balancing of interests between the countries of the outer periphery and the EU. With regard to the failure of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), this also corresponds to the insight of the former European Commissioner for European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, Johannes Hahn: “The idea that our power of attraction would eventually seduce all our neighbours has been proven inaccurate. We were too optimistic.” (quoted from Perchoc 2017: 28) In the run-up to a possible southward and eastward enlargement of the EU, the geopolitical framework conditions have shifted significantly to the detriment of the EU. What is new is the emergence of an alternative – albeit for the time being relatively modest – promise of prosperity of the People’s Republic of China. In other words, the EU is assuming a constellation of interests with regard to enlargement that has been overtaken by reality.

To the detriment of the EU, this shift weakens the EU’s negotiating position and reduces the effectiveness of all conditionalities for the accession countries. Threats of sanctions, especially the possibility of downgrades in the accession process, as outlined in the European Commission’s Revised Enlargement Methodology (REM) since 2020, have become implausible. The dilemma[1] facing the EU is that, on the one hand, it needs this new possibility of negative conditionality in order to be able to react to deteriorations in the political, constitutional, and other situations in a country that occur during the accession process (European Commission 2020: 7). On the other hand, however, this is countered by the demand – especially from the accession countries themselves – that the accession perspective must remain credible and reliable to have a transformative effect. “Pro-reform and pro-modernization incentives can work only if the enlargement process remains credible and affordable for EU candidates” (Dabrowski 2022).

Threats of sanctions, especially the possibility of downgrades in the accession process, as outlined in the European Commission’s Revised Enlargement Methodology (REM) since 2020, have become implausible.

III. Time pressure

The decisive factor for linking the accession processes of the six Western Balkan countries and the Black Sea countries Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia is Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. Prior to this, the EU enlargement process to the Western Balkans had been dormant for many years

Waiting times for the Western Balkan countries

(simplified after Dabrowski, Moffat 2024)

The accession processes of the Western Balkan countries gained new impetus by the accession dynamics of the Black Sea countries threatened by Russia (European Commission 2023; Vulović 2024).

Waiting times for the Black Sea countries

The Russian invasion of Ukraine began on 24 February 2022. Ukraine applied for EU membership on 28 February 2022; Georgia and Moldova followed on 3 March 2022. Ukraine and Moldova were granted candidate status on 23 June 2023, and Georgia on 14 December 2023. In response to Georgia’s government policy, which is considered incompatible with EU standards, negotiations were halted on 28 June 2024. In light of this pace, there was immediate concern in the EU that the Western Balkan countries would view their sluggish accession processes as an unacceptable imposition and that perceived inequality could turn into permanent movements to break away from the EU. Added to this is the rivalry with the People’s Republic of China for economic influence in the Western Balkans. As a result, the southern and eastern enlargement became a package and a “geostrategic imperative” (Kribbe, van Middelaar 2023). The example of Turkey, whose failure to join the EU led to its geopolitical seesaw policy, may have also played a role in this.

The bundling of the two processes – the closing of the Western Balkans gap and the admission of Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia – led to the initiation of accession negotiations with countries that are highly relevant to the EU in geopolitical terms but whose level of democratic, constitutional and economic development – measured against EU accession standards – is still very deficient. The EU is therefore faced with a dilemma between geopolitical and military requirements and incalculable integration costs. This dilemma is being used strategically, at least by the present Hungarian government, to increase the pressure to join. Viktor Orbán is therefore trying to speed up accession negotiations with Serbia in particular, partly hoping to gain a potential ally within the EU. At the same time, a majority of EU member states still seem opposed to the Western Balkan countries joining. ”Everyone is publicly in favour of enlargement, but when the 27 of us foreign ministers close the door behind us, the majority speaks against enlargement.”[2]

 The EU is therefore faced with a dilemma between geopolitical and military requirements and incalculable integration costs.

The dilemma for the EU is that it is under time pressure due to the geopolitical rivalry surrounding the accession processes, while, on the other hand, the development of the rule of law, the fight against corruption, and other reforms take time – time that is needed before accession. The experiences with Poland (up until 2023) and Hungary have left a mark. The EU has “realized that it has less leverage in this area over members (post-accession) than over candidates” (Kribbe, van Middelaar 2023

IV. Democratic deficits in the accession countries

Most of the candidates for southern and eastern EU enlargement are characterised by a sharp division of their populations into pro- and anti-EU attitudes. This division stems from differing perceptions of national identity, which are difficult to reconcile and have the potential to lead to civil unrest. It also creates a sanctions dilemma for the EU, especially in light of anti-Western policies (e.g., the NGO law in Georgia): if the EU imposes sanctions that affect the entire country, it frustrates the pro-EU faction; if it does not react, it strengthens the anti-EU faction. In either case, the pro-EU group feels penalised, or it accuses the EU of unduly upgrading autocratic governments (Lippert 2023a: 3). This prerequisite for a blockade has brought the enlargement process in the Western Balkans to a standstill for a long time. In contrast to the phase prior to the 2004 enlargement, the prospects of accession in the Western Balkans as of 2025 hardly inspire optimism, nor are they triggering substantial reforms toward democracy and the rule of law (Vulović 2024). The EU is consequently waiting for progress, while the accession countries are waiting for EU incentives to reform and integrate. As a result of this blockade, the accession processes are dragging on, and support for accession is waning both within the EU and the accession countries.

The EU is consequently waiting for progress, while the accession countries are waiting for EU incentives to reform and integrate.

Closely related to the sanctions dilemma is the stability-democracy dilemma. On the one hand, the rapid expansion of the EU is necessary in order to counter rival expansionist policies. On the other hand, however, there is the requirement that the accession countries actually need to be “ready for accession” (Bonomi, Mastrorocco 2024: 14). It can be assumed that democracy is insufficiently developed in all accession countries (see the brief overview in Maugeais 2023). While the establishment of democratic institutions is a prerequisite for accession[3], the creation of political stability in the periphery is a key motive for EU enlargement. Political stability and established democracy are compatible, but political stability and the transition to democracy are hardly compatible.

Closely related to the sanctions dilemma is the stability-democracy dilemma.

The dilemma facing the EU can also be described as the incompatibility of two different time horizons: in the long term, democratisation is the appropriate means for political stability; in the short term, however, it disrupts the political stability that authoritarian regimes guarantee. The EU’s short-term interest in stability is at odds with its commitment to promoting democracy. This dilemma cannot be resolved through well-meaning appeals (Maugeais 2023: 6). It has been exacerbated by the changing geopolitical conditions, the time pressure and the special difficulties of democratisation under wartime conditions (Sirbiladze, Ventura 2023).

The EU’s short-term interest in stability is at odds with its commitment to promoting democracy.

V. The sense of sovereignty in the accession countries and sovereignism in the EU

In the course of a southern and eastern enlargement the EU faces a problem that already became evident after the eastward enlargement of 2004/07: the defence of national sovereignty as a question of identity. In the Western Balkans an ethnonationalist-based sense of sovereignty dominates (Petritsch, Pichler 2004), which was consolidated by the wars following the collapse of Yugoslavia and sets narrow limits on political and cultural rapprochement with the EU. Regardless of how it ends, the war of aggression against Ukraine has decisively consolidated its complex identity (Riabchuk 2010), as Putin has made Russia “Ukraine’s constitutive other” (Wilson 2023: 14). To a lesser extent, this probably also applies to Moldova and Georgia. For this reason, the political elites and large parts of the populations of the accession countries cannot be expected to immediately hand over relevant aspects of their recently acquired national sovereignty to the supranational level, to “Brussels”. The EU dilemma is therefore that, on the one hand, these countries can only be integrated as fully sovereign states, but, on the other hand, their national concept of sovereignty means that considerable integration problems are inevitable. The unwieldy problem of identity and democracy is exacerbated by the fact that it finds a counterpart within the EU.

For decades, the term “sovereignty” has increasingly lost its meaning and has finally degenerated into a reactionary fighting word, so “that it is irremediably discredited” (Outhwaite 2021: 35; Vobruba 2012: 54ff.). However, this does not mean ignoring it, but rather taking its rhetorical use seriously as a problem in social science and politics. In this sense, it can be stated that a “populist sovereignism”, or “PopSovism” for short (De Spiegeleire et al. 2017), has spread within the EU and become entrenched in party politics. In contrast to the situation 20 years ago, there are now right-wing parties whose stance on the EU is (at best) ambiguous and an extreme right-wing scene that politically exploits unresolved EU dilemmas and turns them into a fundamental criticism of the EU. In particular, the European Commission is portrayed as the agency of a globalist agenda, a recipient of orders from “foreign enemies” (especially George Soros), corrupt, with a democratic deficit, and is seen as destroying sovereignty – all against the backdrop of a populist concept of the “will of the people”, which is allegedly being sabotaged by the aloof EU elites. I cannot go into the spread of such ideas in conspiracy theory texts here (cf. Vobruba 2024: 68ff.). However, it is clear that there are direct links between conspiracy journalism and EU-relevant politics. I refer only to the Hungarian president’s justification for the “Sovereignty Act” (December 2023), which aims to monitor organisations with foreign financial sources: Foreign countries want to “buy Hungary by the kilo” (Tagesschau 5 February 2024). The links between sovereigntist texts in the Hungarian government’s self-portrayal platform Hungary Today and in so-called alternative media and radical right-wing publications are also relevant here. The fact that Hungary has lost billions in cohesion funds due to rule of law deficits was interpreted by an Austrian conspiracy scene magazine as a “hybrid war against Budapest” and as a sign that “the EU’s war against national sovereignty”[4] is being intensified. Such cross-connections exist among all those political forces that have united in the EU Parliament as the “Patriots for Europe”, “soon derided as ‘Putinists for Europe’” (The Economist 13 July 2024). The present Hungarian government is just the most striking example.

However, it is clear that there are direct links between conspiracy journalism and EU-relevant politics.

VI. Multiple distribution conflicts

Enlargement leads to multiple distribution conflicts, which are determined by a two-stage prosperity gap: differences between old and new EU members and differences between new EU members and accession countries. Here are some key figures to illustrate this (Gross Domestic Product/capita adjusted for purchasing power; International Monetary Fund estimates for 2024): Germany: US-Dollar 67,240; Bulgaria: US-Dollar 35,960; Kosovo: US-Dollar 16,780; Ukraine: US-Dollar 15,460. This results in a ratio between Germany and Bulgaria of just under 2 to 1, between Bulgaria (the poorest EU member state) and Kosovo (the poorest Western Balkan country) of more than 2 to 1, and between Bulgaria and Ukraine of 2.3 to 1. The welfare gap between Germany and Ukraine is 4.35 to 1.

Enlargement leads to multiple distribution conflicts, which are determined by a two-stage prosperity gap: differences between old and new EU members and differences between new EU members and accession countries.

Among the many consequences of the dynamics that create welfare gaps, the distribution conflicts arising from the EU’s redistribution rules are of particular interest here. The accession of countries with a significantly lower level of prosperity leads to conflicts between net contributors (core countries) and all net recipient countries, between old (eastern members) and new net recipient countries (southeastern candidates), and it is generating resistance, particularly from countries that are at risk of becoming net contributors rather than net recipients (Kribbe, van Middelaar 2023). There are already concerns about losing their own net recipient position (Emerson 2023). The pattern of conflict is familiar from the 2004/07 eastward enlargement. Foreseeable distribution conflicts will be exacerbated by various new challenges: from 2028 to 2058, by interest payments and repayment of the community debt incurred to deal with the consequences of the coronavirus crisis (Vobruba 2023: 320ff.), by the growth of competing spending areas, particularly defence and agriculture (with special respect to Ukraine) budgets, and by economic problems in Germany, which is by far the largest net contributor to the EU budget (Nowotny 2023: 7ff.).

A projection by the Jacques Delors Centre Berlin arrives at a fictitious annual budget burden of EUR 13.2 billion for the EU for the seven-year period 2021–2027 as a result of Ukraine’s EU membership from 2021, of which around 90% would be attributable to the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). “Fictitious” here means the assumption that the southern and eastern enlargement will take place under the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF), which was agreed for the period 2021–2027. Lindner, Nguyen and Hansum emphasise that the MFF will have to be renegotiated for the period from 2028, with an unpredictable outcome. For the accession of the Western Balkan countries and Moldova, they arrive at annual budget costs of EUR 5.8 billion using the same fictitious assumptions. In total, they estimate the annual budget burden of a southern and eastern enlargement of the EU (excluding Kosovo and Georgia) at EUR 19 billion (Lindner, Nguyen, Hansum 2023: 7). This results in a notional burden of EUR 133 billion for the entire budget period. In this projection, there are no losses for the previous net beneficiary countries. On the same fictitious basis, Bruegel (Darvas et al. 2024) arrives at a budget burden for the EU of EUR 126 billion in a baseline scenario and EUR 110 billion in an alternative scenario due to Ukraine’s accession alone. Darvas et al. emphasise that these figures do not take into account financial returns from Ukraine to the EU-27 and are therefore (slightly) exaggerated. They expect changes in the support status of regions in some member states as a result of Ukraine’s accession. ”Some EU regions currently classified as ‘less developed regions’ would graduate to ‘transition regions’, and some current ‘transition regions’ would graduate to ‘more developed regions’, implying lower cohesion funding“ (Darvas et al. 2024: 6f.). Their scenarios also do not result in any significant losses for the previous net recipients, at least none that do not already result from existing cut-off rules (Darvas et al. 2024: 53). However, all these projections are based on the fictitious assumption that the rules of the MFF, 2021–2027, will apply to a future enlargement to the south and east and therefore only provide a rough indication of their costs and distributional conflicts. What is certain, however, is that an unintended consequence of individual member states switching from net recipients to net contributors would be that the EU would effectively lose the financial sanction options that the “rule of law mechanism” has provided for since 1 January 2021.

VII. The elimination of buffer zones. War

The EU’s expansion policy has so far been based on the idea of a stable, prosperous core that is protected by multiple rings. The EU members with external EU borders form an inner ring, while the countries of the ENP form the outer ring. The relationship between the EU and the countries of the ENP could be understood as a political exchange: they assume buffer functions for the EU and, in return, are gradually included in the prosperity and stability of the EU. In principle, everything was possible for the ENP countries except participation in the political decision-making process and the EU’s automatic redistribution mechanisms. The success of the ENP has fallen far short of the expectations placed in it. Nowhere has the EU’s outer periphery become the intended “ring of friends” (Prodi 2002; European Commission 2023: 2). In the South, expansionist interests are met with cool-headed interest calculations (Faath 2007), and in the East, with hostility. This means that the EU must redefine its understanding of the buffer zone: previously understood as barriers to mobility for the purpose of shielding against migration (Hilpert 2022), it now also means a security zone between the EU and Russia.

The EU’s expansion policy has so far been based on the idea of a stable, prosperous core that is protected by multiple rings.

The EU’s expansion policy to date has been a project to secure stability, often presented as an export of norms[5], “a convergence agenda within a scenario of pacified spaces” (Lippert 2023b: 478; my translation). You can also put it like this: the eastward enlargement of 2004/2007 took place under the protection of NATO. All the countries joining the EU at that time were already members of NATO. The fact that the expansion process of NATO and the EU was largely frictionless was due to the weakness of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics/Russia at the time. However, this does not change the problem that the expansion dynamic to the east – at least from Putin’s perspective – caused buffer zones to disappear.[6] The Russian occupation of Crimea and the war of aggression against Ukraine confirmed this view of the problem symmetrically and reciprocally through the respective political reactions. Since 2022, there are no longer any countries that could act as a neutral buffer zone to shield the EU’s expansion to the south and east. The EU must therefore “flank its enlargement policy with security policy and coordinate it transatlantically. Because it took a credibility risk when it gave Ukraine the prospect of accession in June 2022” (Lippert 2023b: 480, my translation). The problem is clear: the EU’s credibility with regard to southern and eastern enlargement also depends on conditions (“transatlantic”) that it does not have in hand.

The accession of the eastern neighbours Ukraine and Moldova is most clearly driven by the stability interests of the EU core. In principle, this is the same as the 2004/07 eastward enlargement, but the instability in this EU neighbouring region is being strategically deployed by third parties (i.e., Russia). That is the difference from 2004/07. The EU can therefore start accession negotiations with Ukraine during the war, but accession can only take place at the cost of the EU being drawn into the war due to its obligation to provide assistance (Article 42(7) TEU). The EU is therefore faced with the dilemma of either taking this risk of war or accepting that Russia has a de facto veto over Ukraine’s accession.

The problem is clear: the EU’s credibility with regard to southern and eastern enlargement also depends on conditions (“transatlantic”) that it does not have in hand.

VIII. Conclusion

The starting point was the thesis that a southern and eastern enlargement of the EU is hardly feasible in terms of integration policy but is geopolitically necessary. This is the basic dilemma the EU is currently (2025) facing. The change in the geopolitical framework and time pressure have weakened the EU’s position and exacerbated its problems in enforcing standards of readiness for accession. Closely related to this is the dilemma arising from the divisions of interest in accession countries: accessions with lowered conditions transform the incentives and cause problems at a later stage, but insisting on high standards can frustrate the pro-EU faction and risks turning them away from the accession project. In addition, there is the dilemma that the EU promotes democracy as a guarantor of political stability, but transitions to democracy lead through a phase of political instability. The problems are exacerbated by the entrenchment of sovereignism outside and inside the EU, with hostile or cynical-utilitarian attitudes towards EU membership. Finally, accession in the context of war means either a strong NATO commitment or a de facto veto option for Russia. The consequence is that the prospect of accession to the EU, intended as support, may lead to the perpetuation or the threat of war.

What follows from this? It is certainly of crucial importance to reduce the time pressure of southern and eastern enlargement. It is equally important to develop new ideas for shaping the EU’s neighbourhood. There is little point in continuing with the ENP. It would be much better to risk some at least discursive disruptions: are there countries that show signs of pushing themselves into the role of buffers? They should not be blamed but facilitated. One contribution to this would be an upgrading of buffer zones into peacekeeping intermediary regions, which fulfil an important geopolitical function that should be associated with benefits for them. Nevertheless, the dilemmas facing the EU will remain. They must be seen realistically and communicated openly. This alone will make some of them less dangerous. Enlargement will be a difficult but not impossible mission.

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Foto: Canva/Mark Rubens